SIPP
The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy (SIPP) is a non-profit, independent, non-partisan institute of the University of Regina. Its objective is to improve public policy by undertaking and disseminating timely research on social, economic, fiscal, environmental and public administrative issues of significance and concern to the people of Saskatchewan and to Canadians generally. In pursuing this goal, SIPP may act independently or in partnership with government departments or agencies, other research institutes, and non-governmental organisations, including those from the private and third sectors. It will also endeavour to stimulate informed debate on public-policy issues by inviting knowledgeable individuals to present seminars and lectures to which members of the public will be invited.
The Scholar Series
Each year the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy benefits from the appoint of two Senior Fellows, one appointed by the University of Regina and the other by the Government of Saskatchewan. The fellowships, which are held at the Institute, are each for twelve months, and follow upon the conclusion of competitive processes designed to recognize scholars and practitioners who have made significant contributions in some area of public policy. During their year at SIPP, the Fellows are free to pursue their public-policy research interests and to participate in the various activities of the Institute.
Towards the conclusion of their appointment, each Fellow is expected to present a public lecture on the research they have undertaken during their term at SIPP. Such lectures are published in our Scholar Series, thereby disseminating to a wider audience the ideas and findings of the Fellows.
For his public lecture, Dr. Gregory Marchildon-our first Government of Saskatchewan Senior Fellow-examined Royal Commissions and the policy cycle in Canada, specifically the case of health care.
Dr. Raymond B. Blake Director, Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy measures that are proposed to achieve those objectives." 3 it is up to Cabinet to set the fundamental agenda and choose the major policy objectives, the civil service is responsible for designing the options that will come back to Cabinet and, in the process, shape the more specific policy objectives in the process. In my experience, this often involves a constructive tension between the two tiers of government necessitating compromise on both sides to produce workable policy options while still achieving the original objectives of Cabinet. And often it requires two or three iterations between the civil service and Cabinet (or cabinet committees) before ministers are comfortable with one or another policy option.
This policy cycle is the regular business of government. It is incremental, continuous and hopefully as systematic as possible. In most contexts, these qualities are its strengths. But they can also become its weaknesses if circumstances suddenly change or if long held assumptions underpinning a set of policies, no longer hold, or are perceived to be fundamentally flawed, either by the electorate or the elected members sitting in the cabinet room. In such situations, the policy cycle can be punctuated by a major, and often discontinuous, shift in political agenda setting.
This sudden shift may spring from an emergency within the government such as a major internal budgetary crisis. Or it may emanate from an unexpected threat that is external to the government, as the recent events of September 11 th so graphically illustrated. It may be triggered by a change of government after an election in which the winning party had campaigned on a detailed platform of change. Finally, it may represent the final climax of a permanent structural shift forcing a long overdue policy change.
On occasion, the governing party can initiate a major policy shift if it feels that a particular policy area requires a fundamental re-examination, in part because of a profound dissatisfaction by Cabinet with the status quo, particularly when this unhappiness is shared by a significant percentage of the public. Governing parties can always rely on their extensive bureaucracies to conduct policy reviews. In Canada, however, more often than not, the bureaucracy has "acted more as a conservative force of continuity" than as an "instigator of change." 7 There are also times that government will want the review completed by an entity with fewer or no ties to the status quo policy and by a person or organization that is seen to be independent of the entire government and therefore "objective." This "independence" is an important feature if the governing party wants the latter to open up the inquiry to the general citizenry to get its input.
There are a number of potential vehicles available to governing parties at the federal and provincial levels, each with different attributes. Three of the more common instruments are compared in Table 1 . Each has its advantages and its disadvantages. No one instrument is inherently superior to the others. More importantly, the very structural characteristic that is a strength in one set of circumstances can become a weakness in a different set of circumstances. Without doubt, these instruments can be used by governments as a means to "buy time", to delay making decisions on extremely difficult and controversial policy changes. Or they can be used to seek out external validation for a policy direction already decided but not yet acceptable to the general public. Such uses, however, can come at a high political price as the Canadian public and media is far less accepting of these less than justifiable uses than in the past. The permanent external advisory body -a law reform commission for exampleshould provide ongoing advice aimed at fundamental reform in one policy subject area.
As specialized organizations with a lengthy tenure, their policy capacity is generally quite extensive. They are structured to be arm's length, and therefore independent, from government. Their reports are made public although generally targeted to those that have are directly affected by their recommendations. Traditionally, external advisory bodies have not held consultations with the general public although they are at least informally in touch with the organized stakeholders in the system.
The strength of permanent advisory bodies is that they provide a very long-term stream of focused advice to governments. Their weakness is that interest in the body's work can decrease with time as the system adjusts to the general tenor of the advice and the novelty wears off. On a more negative note, some permanent advisory bodies have been know to become overly influenced, or even captured, by the powerful interest groups that populate their subject area thereby reducing the utility of the policy advice they offer. Ministerial task forces are sometimes seen as too tied to the governments that create them, a perception reinforced by the fact that many of their supporting personnel are often drawn from the appointing Ministry even if the Chairperson and committee members are drawn from outside government. 13 The external task force, however, can be seen as independent if the external individuals appointed are seen as independent and behave accordingly, including conducting extensive public consultations. The advantage is such a task force can draw quite extensively on the resources of the given government department, including a number of departmental personnel. The disadvantage is that the task force may be perceived as dependent on the department and its advice. I think this may be one of the reasons that, in Canada, these instruments are generally referred to as Ministerial task forces rather than departmental task forces, the general descriptor used in the United Kingdom. Commission on Health Care -did deal with aspects of health care reform in the 1980s. 18 The royal commission has two principle advantages. As an organization created under the federal Inquiries Act or its provincial equivalent, it has legal autonomy from the government in power. As Peter Aucoin has pointed out, a royal commission can be a government's "most effective option" because of its "greater capacity to be, and to be seen to be, independent and objective" than other potential instruments. 19 In addition, policy-oriented royal commissions are provided with the budget necessary to conduct their own, intensive, research independent of government. Indeed, they are expected to conduct scholarly social science research that will be published in order to meet the implicit educational portion of their mandates. 20 Royal commissions have had a tradition of sponsoring external research that it then draws upon to whatever extent the commission deems useful or relevant. Unlike most ministerial task forces, the work itself is often then published under the researcher's name either under the auspices of the commission or independently after the commission has completed its work. This work can lead to contradictions with the commission's analysis and recommendations but is highly tolerated. My own use of the word "extraordinary" reflects my own view that none of the instruments described in Table 1 should be used unless necessary. As Tommy MacLeod pointed out long ago, it is likely counter-productive bypassing the civil service except in the most exceptional circumstances. 23 First of all, the civil service does have detailed subject knowledge of the policy area and will certainly know more about how different policy options can actually be implemented. Second, from the perspective of the citizen and taxpayer, we are already paying for this governmental machinery so why not use it to its full potential.
The question is whether you truly require an off ramp from normal governmental processes in order to obtain more innovative and higher quality policy advice. Certainly, this proposition could be used to test the past output of external advisory bodies, committees, task forces and commissions relative to what was being offered to cabinet by the civil service just before the decision was made to take the off ramp.
In any case, even when their use is justified, these extraordinary instruments are supplements to the governmental decision-making process, not replacements for it. The ultimate reports produced by these extraordinary instruments are, in the end, only advisory to governments. It is the democratic responsibility of the political tier of government to make final policy decisions. On this last point, it has always been a false criticism of task forces and commissions that they are of limited value because no government has to adopt their recommendations. The argument is not only fundamentally flawed in terms of democratic theory but misunderstands as well the nature of public policy formulation.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , a task force, committee or commission report gets back into the regular policy cycle through cabinet selecting which, if any, of the recommendations it wants to proceed with. The civil service is left with the task of designing the options that will give life to the recommendations. These are then brought back to cabinet for decision and, quite often, returned to the civil service for further refinement.
This is a very important step given that most external reports are focused on ultimate destinations rather than the various ways a government can get from point A (the status quo) to point B (the recommended destination), and as we all know the extent to which the "devil can lie in the details." This process, including the political job of cabinet selecting among a series of controversial options, can take a very long time.
Choice of Extraordinary Instrument: The Royal Commission
Once a decision is made in favour of getting "outside help", governments must carefully consider the choice of instrument. In terms of independence, cost and time, royal commissions are the most "extraordinary" of the extraordinary instruments available to government when it requires a temporary (although not necessarily brief) off ramp from the regular policy life cycle. In my view, royal commissions should be restricted to cases where:
• The policy problem at hand is both significant and fundamental in nature therefore eventually requiring a basic directional decision by government;
• The particular policy problem and its potential solutions would benefit from being fully aired in public;
• The policy problem and its proposed solutions would benefit from drawing, in a temporary organization special built for the purpose, on research and analysis from individuals and groups outside government;
• The extensive consultations with the general public and interested stakeholders are better conducted by a legally independent third party from government;
• The government itself has fundamental questions about the direction and options surrounding the policy problem in question and it is willing to wait for the deliberations and recommendations of a royal commission; and This is unsurprising in one sense. There have been major systemic changes since
Medicare was first introduced. Much more health care is delivered outside hospitals and doctors' offices, the traditional core services of the public system. As a consequence, more and more important medical services are falling outside of public coverage. We now pay more for prescription drugs than for physicians in this country yet most public drug coverage (outside hospitals) by the provinces and territories is limited to the very poor. There has been a sharp rise in chronic diseases that require more home care and long-term care outside of hospitals yet we continue to focus our public coverage on hospital care.
The reasons for the current policy angst go beyond these systemic changes, however. They even go beyond the average citizen's immediate concerns about quality, timeliness, cost and sustainability today. Canadians are suffering collective angst because of their intuitive knowledge that their governments are at the precipice of making major directional decisions concerning the future of Medicare. But they are confused on the fundamental direction of this change.
On one side, supported by the findings of the National Forum on Health and numerous health policy experts, they are encouraged to continue going down the road of expanding universal, public coverage beyond hospital and physician care to prescription drug care, home care and long term care. On the other side, they are told that we must limit public coverage for hospitals and doctors (or replace it with private coverage), and that we need to reduce unnecessary utilization through patient co-payments and user fees.
As I discussed earlier, governments throughout this country are responding to this collective angst through a variety of extraordinary instruments. While Quebec, While this appears to be an unprecedented amount of activity, it is symptomatic of a basic re-thinking of our health care system today. As Canadians, it is worth reminding ourselves that we have been there before.
The Hall Commission
The late 1950s and early 1960s were a difficult time for both Canadians and their governments in terms of health care policy, specifically as it related to public coverage.
Beginning in 1957, hospitalization was introduced nationally. Universal public coverage for catastrophic health care quickly became the accepted policy throughout Canada.
However, a huge debate surrounded the question of whether a universal, single-payer, income tax-funded system of public coverage should be extended to physician services.
The alternative, a multi-payer system of private insurance, had grown dramatically in the postwar period and seemed a viable alternative, particularly when combined with targeted, means-tested, public coverage for the very poor.
Although many Canadians were attracted to the notion of expanding public coverage, governments were divided for both ideological and financial reasons. The
Diefenbaker government was itself torn on the issue and appointed the Royal quickly became a pan-Canadian public policy debate. 26 Emmett Hall and his commission members did their best to distance themselves from the growing controversy. He repeatedly said that his commission was about health care more broadly defined and was upset that his hearings became the focal point for a narrower debate about whether public coverage should be extended beyond hospitals to physicians' services. In the Regina hearing in January 1962, he went "out of his way to say that the commission had no intention of 'taking sides' in the simmering dispute" and sharply questioned the Saskatchewan health minister on his pro-Medicare submission. 27 The Final Report, delivered two years later, came as a surprise to many. Hall went far further than anyone expected in recommending the extension of comprehensive and universal public coverage beyond hospital care for:
• Medical services;
• Prescription drugs;
• Home Care services;
• Prosthetic services;
• Dental services, for children, pregnant mothers, and welfare recipients; and,
• Optical services, for children and welfare recipients.
For good measure, Hall threw in a proposed Health Charter for Canadians, the goal of which was the "achievement of the highest possible health standards for all"
Canadians and that this "become a primary objective of national policy" as well as a cohesive factor contributing to national unity." This was, in the report's words, "best achieved through a comprehensive, universal Health Services Programme for the Canadian people." 28 Hall turned over his expansive menu (or, as some said at the time, his "expensive" menu) to Prime Minister Pearson's Liberal government. Hall suggested that Ottawa use the federal spending power to entice the provinces into introducing public coverage, adding that the provinces should exercise "the right to determine the order of priority of each service and the timing of its introduction."
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Pearson first had to deal with the division within his own cabinet between those who supported the immediate introduction of Medicare (the word that had become a synonym for public coverage beyond hospital care although how much beyond had not yet been defined) and those that wanted to wait until public finances were on a more solid footing.
After preparatory work by key civil servants accompanied by much strife within the cabinet and caucus, the Medicare bill was finally passed in December 1966, with a late start date of July 1968 to begin negotiations with the provinces and territories. These negotiations would take almost four years to complete. The reason for this is simple:
provincial governments (cabinets and bureaucracies), particularly those with deeply rooted systems of private coverage, had to carefully work out the ways in which public coverage could be introduced with minimal disruption to private insurers and doctors as well as to their own budgets. In the end, it would take a total of eight years to implement
Hall's one recommendation on public coverage for physician services throughout Canada. 30 We must always be careful with historical facts, particularly when they conflict with current conventional wisdom. Today, the Hall report is viewed as one of the more successful royal commissions in our history in terms of its "big bang" impact and speed of adoption. I am sure that it did not feel like that to Emmett Hall as he waited from 1964 until 1972 to see his report recommendations implemented, and even then, only partially adopted.
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Conclusion
While there are some striking similarities in terms of the policy debate of the early 1960s
and today, much has also changed since the Hall Commission such as medical technology and research as well the locus of delivery caused by changes in our patterns of disease, injury, illness and health to give only two examples. These changes have had an impact on our notions of comprehensiveness and accessibility as described under the Canada Health Act services that constitute the core of Medicare. It is now more difficult to see a health care system as "comprehensive" if it is limited to hospital and physician services.
It is equally difficult to define our access to home care and long term care services for the chronically ill -access that continues to be based more on ability to pay than on need -as the kind of "accessibility" foreseen by the architects of Medicare.
As in the early 1960s, a basic directional decision on Medicare is now required.
Despite their ideological predilections, governments are in a genuine quandary about what to do. More right-of-centre governments would like to see the private sector take up some of the space currently covered by public actors or public administration in the current system but face electorates that are uneasy about such changes. Left-of-centre governments would prefer to keep or expand public coverage but are concerned about their ability to continue funding health care out of their general revenue funds without cutting into other important public services. Citizens themselves are very concerned, knowing that they will ultimately pay the growing bill for health care, either through their taxes or directly out of pocket. At the same time, most are very proud of, and very attached to, a social policy that has come to define their citizenship more than any other single policy.
In the circumstances, I would argue that an independent royal commission calling upon the best research and policy analysis available as well as conducting a dialogue with the Canadian public could be extremely useful. To save money and time, however, it should avoid as much overlap with, and duplication of, the work of other task forces, committees and commissions to the greatest extent possible. To provide clarity, it must produce a final report with hard decisions on the most difficult, directional matters. And to provide direction, it must produce a report with viable and politically feasible recommendations.
In the end, however, it will be governments that shall make the final decisions on a royal commission's recommendations. At the point of cabinet decision and implementation, the function of the extraordinary policy review will have come to an end, and health care policy will again be subject to the internal policy cycle where it will hopefully remain for at least a few years.
